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Introduction 
 
Transition to the market in the former Soviet Union has occasioned an extensive overhaul of 
the statistical and planning apparatuses inherited from the Soviet period in all the newly 
independent states, including the republics of Central Asia. The creation of a new 
informational infrastructure,  prompted by the demands of major international donor and 
lending agencies, appears to be an intrinsic, if little noticed, adjunct of market reforms. Part 
of the rationale behind these changes is to bring certain indices and measurements (such as 
definitions of employment, the measurement of prices, living standards and poverty) into line 
with internationally agreed standards set by bodies such as the ILO, WHO, OECD and the 
IMF. The shift from universal welfare provision under the Soviet system to  ‘targeted’ 
assistance and  poverty monitoring also requires the development of new policy tools. 
Finally, the design and implementation of development projects funded by various donor 
agencies has created additional demand for social and economic data. As a consequence of 
these changing priorities, a significant amount of technical assistance is being directed to 
upgrading information-gathering techniques and creating the domestic capacity to sustain 
these efforts.  The data collection tools inherited from the era of central planning ( such as 
the Soviet Union Family Budget Survey ) are being revised and modified while, 
simultaneously, a range of externally funded sample surveys are being carried out (see 
Falkingham and Micklewright, 1997, for details). The volume of social research conducted 
in the private and NGO sectors has also increased substantially. This has resulted in a 
proliferation of sample surveys, mainly based on closed-ended questionnaires and relying on 
quantitative techniques of data analysis. In particular, household surveys have emerged as a 
prime tool for generating policy relevant information. 
 
The main contention of this paper is that transition economies may present us with special 
methodological challenges that need to be adequately reflected in research design. In the 
absence of  an in-depth understanding of the local meanings attached to the categories that 
are  most routinely employed in questionnaires and interview schedules, survey findings can 
be of limited utility, and may even be quite misleading. More specifically, I will attempt to 
show how the combination of Soviet categories of ‘official’ registration, local cultural 
understandings and  recent changes introduced by agrarian reforms may act to foil the best 
intentioned attempts at receiving meaningful answers to seemingly straightforward questions. 
My illustrations will be drawn from a household survey I conducted in four villages from two 
regions of Uzbekistan, Andijan and Kashkadarya, between October 1997 and August 
1998.1 The survey was preceded by in-depth household case studies and detailed 
observations in order to avoid  errors and biases stemming from the lack of adequate 
qualitative information.2 It, nevertheless, highlighted the intrinsic ambiguities of some of the 
categories employed and the limitations of the survey as a tool in a context where the 
meanings attached to many concepts are in a state of flux.3 In what follows, I shall describe 
these difficulties in relation to five central concepts, namely,  those of household, 
employment, access to land, income and expenditure. I shall attempt to illustrate how the 
contents of these categories are not only context-specific but are also shifting in response to 
changes in the rural environment of  Uzbekistan. 
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Households: elusive boundaries  
 
The household (or domestic unit)  generally refers to a group of co-resident persons who 
share most aspects of consumption and draw upon a common pool of resources for their 
livelihood. However, the sheer diversity of patterns of rural householding documented in 
ethnographic accounts makes this definition too simplistic and renders the concept itself 
rather elusive. On the other hand, ‘official’ definitions of what constitutes a household, 
deployed for the purposes of enumeration and the delivery of social benefits and 
entitlements, have an undeniable concreteness. The effects of these definitions  may not be 
overlooked, although they may take different forms in different contexts. 
 
There are a significant differences between studies of households carried out in the 
industrialised West and those based in the less industrialised economies of the South. In the 
case of the former, the state and the welfare system are acknowledged as important agents 
informing both livelihood strategies and decisions about employment and the allocation of 
household tasks and budgetary resources (see for instance, Morris, 1984,1987; 
Pahl,1984,1988). In the latter, there is generally little reference to the role of supra-
household or non-kin based agencies, reflecting the weakness or  absence of social safety 
nets, especially  in rural areas. Societies that have experienced collectivisation occupy a 
rather distinctive place in this respect since their rural populations have access to a range of 
benefits and entitlements through membership in collective enterprises and state welfare 
legislation. However, here as elsewhere, the question of the degree of  “fit” between the 
actual practices of entities registered as households and the official assumptions made about 
them constitutes a vexed and complicated issue.4 Rural households in Uzbekistan  present 
specific problems for  researchers using standard sampling techniques based on selsovet 
(village administration) records, the most commonly used sampling frame for  surveys. This 
is due to the fact that the relationship between official registration as  separate units of co-
residence and actual separateness  as  budgeting and production units can be quite tenuous 
and variable. 
 
Physically, rural domestic units cluster around a courtyard (auli) where the garden plot, 
poultry and animals may be kept and where separate living quarters may be built for married 
sons. A distinction is made in the Uzbek language between household (hodjalik) and family 
(oila), and multiple family households are quite commonplace. Post-marital residence is 
virilocal and although it is typically the youngest son who inherits the parental home and 
cohabits with elderly or widowed parents, other married sons are, if possible, 
accommodated around the same auli. Some sons may leave the courtyard altogether and 
set up residentially and financially separate households. This becomes inevitable when there 
is no spare plot to house them or when circumstances take them elsewhere. Parental 
expectations of  co-habitation with at least one married son are high although, in practice, 
many households diverge from this pattern. Married couples working for collective 
enterprises that provide them with purpose built apartment accommodation (zhil dom) tend 
to live in smaller household units. Elderly couples who have no sons or co-resident 
unmarried children may be found living either on their own or with grandchildren.   
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Within this framework, village records provide an imperfect guide to the actual number of 
households since there is a tendency for families, whether they are co-resident in the same 
auli or not, to register as separate units. This entitles them to separate private plots and to 
child benefit and income support when their  income falls below a certain level.5 Moreover, 
families sharing the same courtyard may have different budgeting arrangements. In local 
parlance, they may either ‘share the same cooking pot’ (kazan bir) or keep separate pots 
(kazan alahada) and constitute separate budgeting units. The decision to share daily 
consumption or otherwise involves a wide range of considerations, both monetary and 
relational, and may undergo modifications  depending on changing circumstances.  
 
Mindful of these distinctions, the interview schedule used in the household survey referred to 
above did not simply take the households registered in the selsovet records at face value, 
but also ascertained whether they had separate cooking pots or not. Such was the case of 
Omina and Abdulkarim, a newly married couple, who had set up a residentially separate 
household and reported keeping a separate budget and “their own” cooking pot. However, 
they had not been allocated a private plot, apart from the land on which their house was 
built, and appeared to have no visible means of support since the one was unemployed and 
the other a kolkhoz worker who had not received wages for months. It is only later, in 
connection to questions on crops harvested and sold, that it became apparent that this 
couple was still working on the plots of Abdulkarim’s paternal household and receiving a 
portion of their harvest and income. This was a clear-cut case where the separation  of 
residence and daily consumption gave few clues on the actual allocation of agricultural and 
other tasks among married sons. Corrective action by the researcher was clearly needed 
here to reconstitute the full domestic unit that made this young family viable. Indeed, families 
that do not cook and live together may nonetheless continue to cultivate common plots, 
share the produce and remain enmeshed in daily ties of sharing and exchange of products, 
labour and services structured along gender and seniority lines. This type of corrective action 
may be particularly difficult to accommodate in large scale surveys based on fixed sampling 
fractions and  using teams of interviewers, assuming that local variations in budget control 
had  been identified in the first place. 
 
Conversely, common residence and a shared cooking pot may act to conceal the tacit 
separation of incomes and expenditures of co-resident families. Zuhra and Sodik are elderly 
pensioners cohabiting with a married son, his bride (kelin) and their unmarried children. 
They report cooking together. However, when asked about who keeps the household 
money and who asks for money from whom when necessary, Zuhra says; ‘We keep and 
spend our own pension. They keep their own money’. Although they may share the produce 
of their land plots, they go their separate ways when it comes to cash expenditure. This 
tendency may have been exacerbated by the fact that pensions have become the sole source 
of cash income in many households where  kolkhoz  workers  are paid intermittently and 
only in kind. Clearly, depending on circumstances, such sharing arrangements may be 
revised and modified. In one case, a widowed pensioner, Omina, decided to separate her 
cooking pot from her elder son, who already has four children, and to share her pension 
income only with her youngest married son who has no regular income and a disability. She 
justifies her initiative as follows : ’Why should I share my pension with all of them ? The 
older children grow, the more they eat. To each his own, it’s better that way’. 
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To complicate matters further, relational considerations may exercise a considerable 
influence on the reporting of even the most seemingly straightforward items. The household 
survey in Andijan and Kashkadarya also included interviews with all cohabiting, adult 
women. This often meant that mother-in-law/daughter-in-law pairs had to answer the same 
questions (albeit separately). Concerning the ownership of household durables ( such as 
televisions, sewing machines or furniture ), the answers of co-habiting pairs tended to be 
identical, which was what one would normally expect. There was, however, a notable 
exception of a daughter-in-law who reported owning only a cupboard, the one she had 
brought with her trousseau, omitting to mention other household items that were plainly 
available. When I queried this apparent anomaly, I was informed that this kelin was having a 
particularly bad relationship with her mother-in-law. This was evidently her way of signalling 
her disaffection with and alienation from her husband’s family. In a rare twist of events, there 
was also one case of a bride reporting a car among household possessions, an item that was 
left out of her mother-in-law’s account. This was a case where the older woman only had 
access to her pension money, whereas the bride claimed to be in control of general 
household finances.  
 
Similar considerations seem to have applied in some responses to a question concerning the 
number of co-resident families in the household. In some cases, widowed parents, with or 
without unmarried children, were considered to constitute a separate family, in other cases 
they were not. Divorced daughters who came back to live with their parents, with or without 
children, were considered as a separate family, pointing to the anomalous, and hopefully 
transitory, nature of their current status.6 Neither the boundaries of constituent families within 
households, nor those between households are fixed entities. Rather, they may themselves 
become the object of negotiation and redefinition, depending on a range of  material and 
emotional circumstances.  
 
Domestic units are, therefore, best conceptualised as the site of multiple and interlocking sets 
of processes. These may activate different sub-sets of individuals who may constitute 
appropriate units of analysis, depending on the nature of the research question posed. For 
instance, the analysis of family planning decisions may require a different unit of analysis than, 
say, the allocation of intra-household resources. Since the exploration of these boundaries is 
part and parcel of the research process, there is a sense in which units of analysis may 
sometimes emerge a posteriori.  
 
This is precisely  what happened in the household survey in Andijan and Kashkadarya 
where I found the links between co-residence, budget control and household divisions of 
labour (in both domestic and production tasks) to be varied and complex as well as fluid. 
Even the use of so-called ‘filter questions’ (in this particular case, trying to sort out 
households with a common vs. separate cooking pot at the outset) proved unequal to the 
task of identifying the boundaries of domestic units for the purposes of my investigation. Yet 
the general tendency in survey research is to assume that households correspond to officially 
registered units of residence and that these, in turn, constitute discrete budgeting units. A 
more flexible and exploratory approach clearly needs to be adopted, one that is more open 
to trial and error. The qualitative methodologies habitually employed at the pilot stage of 
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surveys, whether these take the form of focus group discussions, participatory and 
observational techniques, may not be sufficient in themselves to secure adequate 
questionnaire design. However, an unexpected bonus of the survey may reside in the 
heuristic value of the inconsistencies, gaps and apparent inaccuracies of the responses 
provided- what are normally dismissed as “errors”. This is what the rest of this paper will 
attempt to demonstrate, starting with the category of “employment”.  
 
 
Employment vs. livelihoods ?  
 
Although it is a commonplace that the concept of “employment” is itself an artifact of  
regulation (as most discussions on the informal economy keep reminding us), this is nowhere 
more apparent that in the republics of the former Soviet Union. In the case of our survey, a 
strikingly high proportion of respondents declared themselves “unemployed”, even as they 
gave detailed descriptions of their farming, animal husbandry or trading activities. This was 
not an attempt at dissimulation; they were, indeed, “officially” unemployed.  
 
In the Soviet Union ( and currently in Uzbekistan) all employees are provided with a 
workbook (trudovaya knishka in Russian, or mihnat daftarchasi in Uzbek) which is 
registered with their employer for the entire duration of their time with that enterprise. If a 
workbook is “with the person himself/herself” rather than with an employer this constitutes 
an interruption of service and reflects detrimentally on pension rights (with the exception of 
one and a half years allowed for maternity leave, or dekret). It is therefore important to 
keep one’s workbook registered with an enterprise whether one is drawing a salary or not.  
 
The restructuring of farm enterprises in Uzbekistan7 created different categories of 
employees; those registered, and still receiving a salary (generally in managerial positions), 
those registered, without receiving a salary ( some skilled workers who now work on their 
own account), those registered, but receiving irregular payment and only in kind (unskilled 
agricultural workers), and those who are  struck off the books altogether and “keep their 
own workbook”. These latter identify themselves as unemployed, regardless of what else 
they do and how much they earn.8 
 
Among the “officially” employed, current patterns are also getting increasingly complex, 
especially in urban areas. There are people who are registered with an enterprise for pension 
purposes but do not do the job they are registered for, nor do they draw a salary. There are 
also those who are registered in an enterprise, and do another job entirely. Not surprisingly, 
with the collapse of public sector employment and  precipitous drops in wages what used to 
be “subsidiary” activities or “unofficial” incomes now often become the mainstay of 
household budgets. However, for the purposes of surveys (an official activity par excellence)  
many will still report the place where their workbook is registered, and the “official” salary 
that goes with it, regardless of what they actually do to make a living and how much they 
might actually earn.  
 
This was quite apparent among registered shirkat workers in the survey (constituting   the 
majority of rural workers)  who reported a monthly wage that had by now become quite 
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fictitious. Within the framework of a household survey, unless special precautions are taken, 
this makes  the calculation of household incomes quite problematic. There is a sense in 
which this insistence on official wages has to do, at least partly, with a desire by respondents 
to depict their current situation as somehow “anomalous”, a situation that could not last 
indefinitely and might, again, be put right. Especially now that no stigma attaches to informal 
activities, which are no longer considered illegal, this tenacity cannot be attributed to 
attempts at concealment. This could hardly be the case in the context of a survey where all 
other sources of income  were gone into in considerable detail.  I had to acknowledge the 
extent to which local understandings of what constitutes a “proper” job and the benefits that 
go with it had been deeply conditioned by Soviet institutions. The sense of grievance 
experienced by those subjected to late payment of benefits, for instance, also conveyed a 
sense of outrage about a loss of  normalcy. It is, of course,  conceivable that a major 
overhaul of the welfare system and phasing out the workbooks in favour of different 
arrangements may, in time, change people’s apprehensions and expectations. It is also clear 
that this is an area where a great deal of resistance is likely to manifest itself.9  
 
What is directly pertinent to the argument at hand, is that extreme vigilance is required when 
formulating questions on current employment status. The issue of whether salaries are 
actually received or not, at what intervals, the calculations of money equivalents of in kind 
payments and the extent to which currently non-salaried jobs offer scope for non-offical 
wages to be earned10 must all be taken into account. This is  difficult to achieve in view of an 
understandable reticence to report unofficial earnings. Informal activities, such as trading in 
markets, are reported with greater ease. These activities are, in fact, subject to regulation 
since it is necessary to register and pay the bazarkom (the officer in charge of allocating 
spaces and collecting charges) for one’s stall or spot. On the other hand, it is common 
knowledge that although a  bazarkom’s official wages may be quite low this is a sought after 
and profitable position offering plenty of opportunities for unofficial emoluments which 
provide a handsome supplement. This is a point I shall return to in greater detail when 
discussing the question of household incomes.  
 
But first we must consider the crucial question of access to  the main source of rural 
livelihood, namely land.  
 
 
 
 
Access to land: moving  the goalposts  
 
Among the republics of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is noted for pursuing a gradual strategy of 
partial changes in the area of agrarian reform (Spoor, 1995; Ilkhamov, 1998). Unlike  
neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there has not been a disbanding of  kolkhozes 
but rather the creation of what Ilkhamov has described as a three-tiered rural economy. This 
structure consists of collective farms, still occupying the major part of irrigated, arable land, 
a thin layer of private peasant farms, and a mass of collective farm employees who cultivate 
household smallholdings. Ilkhamov has cogently argued that the local elite has a stake in the 
maintenance of this type of agrarian economy since it ensures a minimum subsistence level 
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for the peasantry whilst preserving the monopoly of the government and administrative elites 
over land and water resources and over cotton, the leading and most lucrative export 
commodity  
 
However, despite the absence of de jure privatisation land is de facto increasingly 
becoming a commodity through the development of  the leasehold market. Local 
administrations and collective farms face the contradictory pressures of having to 
simultaneously fulfil state procurement quotas for crops  (cotton and wheat), continue to 
allocate private plots to households for their own use and entering leasehold arrangements 
with farmers under the new rules of the Land Law. This is creating an unprecedented 
indeterminacy in the mechanisms of land allocation. 
 
Villagers have access to different types of plots. The first type is the land plot on which their 
house is built and may accommodate a small kitchen garden. This is held in perpetuity and is 
inheritable. The second type is the tamorka or private subsidiary plot to which all citizens 
have been entitled  since Soviet times. After independence in 1991 the legal size of personal 
plots was increased substantially, from 0.1 ha. to 0.25 ha. of  irrigated land and 0.5 ha. of 
non-irrigated land. These are usually allocated from the land reserves of collective farms 
and, in densely populated areas, may be located some distance away from house plots.  
 
On the collective farm itself, two types of land tenure arrangements may coexist; leasehold 
peasant farms and sharecropping arrangements with farm management on annually 
negotiated terms. In principle, leasehold peasant farms are free to market their own produce 
but, in practice, they also opt for a sharecropping arrangement with the collective farm on 
which they depend for inputs, transport and access to markets. Independent peasant 
(dekhan) farms are those with the status of separate juridical entities and the right to open 
their own bank accounts. They may hold leases of up to ten years. These are few in number 
and have been experiencing reverses rather than expanding. A TACIS report (1996) on the 
Samarkand district noted a decline in the number of independent peasant farms since 1995. 
The operations of peasant farms are, in fact, quite severely restricted since they have 
contracts with collective farms to grow particular crops under sharecropping arrangements. 
These frequently exceed the legal requirement of crops and quantities ( 50% of wheat or 
cotton) they must deliver but farmers have weak bargaining power in setting the terms of 
their contracts. Furthermore, the collective farm is often in arrears of payments,  leaving 
independent  farmers strapped for cash, unable to pay for essential inputs or acquiring them 
by selling produce privately and therefore falling short of their contracted production quotas. 
Some private farms were closed down with reference to Article 13 of the Land Law stating 
that if  land is not used properly it should revert to the collective. There are, therefore, 
significant structural obstacles to the development of this type of tenure. 
 
The household survey in Andijan and Kashkadarya reflected the land tenure situation 
described above quite accurately. Out of 100 surveyed households, only one was identified 
as an independent peasant farm. This conforms to the official data (1.5 peasant farms per 
1000 population, approximating 150-170 households) reported by Ilkhamov ( op.cit.). The 
different categories of land tenure were also correctly identified. However, the 
precariousness of tenure from year to year was not adequately taken into account, leading to 
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puzzling inconsistencies in the case of one particular village. Several households had 
mentioned rice as their most important marketable crop. However, the household plots 
reported and the crops grown on them did not include rice  Upon closer scrutiny, it became 
apparent that this rice was grown on subsidiary plots (tamorka) allocated during the past 
season. In the current agricultural season, the  shirkat decided to take this land back to 
plant cotton. One can only surmise that there had been a shortfall in cotton production 
quotas. That meant the allocations of  tamorka land would only be made on wheat land 
after the harvest, allowing households to grow vegetables only, which are both perishable 
and much lower in value than rice. This decision had created consternation since household 
budgets would be depleted by this serious loss of income.  
 
Another crop which made an unaccountable appearance in one of the households was 
several tons of onions reported as sold but not as grown on any of the plots to which the 
household stated having access to. It appeared that the head of the household had entered 
into a sharecropping arrangement with the brigade chief (the overseer and manager of work 
brigades) on the collective farm to plant  onions after the wheat harvest in return for a 
proportion of the produce. The degree of formality involved in this and similar arrangements 
is not always entirely clear. A widow living with her married sons also reported their 
household had harvested four tons of carrots,  one of which was given to the brigade chief 
“for the village kindergarten”. Whether this transaction took place in the context of a formal 
sharecropping contract or not was, again, rather vague. What is quite clear, however, is that 
since land allocation continues to depend on collective farm managers  this gives them 
considerable power. They have discretion over the quantity, quality and distance from the 
homestead of the plots leased out, over the terms of the lease and on whether a household is 
allocated  land or not. In one particular instance, one household was in serious financial 
difficulty and had no land plots at all. It transpired that they had not been allocated any after 
a falling out with the head of the kolkhoz two years ago. 
 
Aside from the vagaries of relationships with collective farm managers, a more insidious 
underlying source of  instability in current land tenure arrangements, resides in the inevitable 
tensions arising from simultaneously attempting to provide villagers with a subsistence base 
(and even expanding it under the new Land Law) and establishing land as a commodity 
through the expansion and diversification of  leasehold markets. Inevitably, the claims that 
rural households make to the land they are,  in principle, legally entitled to cultivate may be 
curtailed by the competing claims and priorities of farm managers . Given the fact that 
kolkhoz  employees who no longer receive wages have become more dependent than ever 
on subsistence farming (and the sale of their crops whenever possible) there is a limit beyond 
which local administrators may not squeeze them without creating serious distress and 
discontent. However, there are already signs that this delicate balance may be tilting away 
from the interests of smallholders.  
 
It would appear that even the very  partial process of commodification initiated by agrarian 
reform in Uzbekistan has set in motion changes that are likely to result in new pressures on 
smallholder households. Better off households are able to enter into private hire 
arrangements with the tractor and combine drivers of the kolkhoz who get paid either in 
cash or in kind. But the shortage of cash and inability to pay for inputs has already meant 
 11
that the level of mechanisation has dropped considerably for the great majority. On the other 
hand, private ownership of tractors is rising and households that can command both farming 
implements and some capital may look further afield than their own village for land to lease. 
The notion that outsiders who are not members of the collective may thus receive access to  
land is bound to create great ambivalence and there is likely to be conflict between 
communal norms and expectations and statutory rights under the new legislation.11 
 
This shifting landscape of access to land and wages has meant that household incomes are 
now generated through a wider range of activities and take multiple forms. 
 
 
Household income: official, unofficial and informal 
 
In his study of the Soviet informal economy, Grossman (1989) made a conceptual 
distinction between the informal second economy which was outside legal regulation and 
informal incomes that derive partly from the second economy and partly from illegal 
transfers such as bribes, embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. He 
suggested that informal incomes constituted a sizeable portion of household budgets and that 
these tended to increase in both absolute and relative terms as one moved from north to 
south (particularly into Transcaucasia and Central Asia) and from major urban centres  to 
smaller cities and the countryside. In an earlier ethnography of a Siberian collective farm, 
Humphrey (1982) showed that some unofficial or illegitimate roles were, in fact, essential to 
the smooth functioning of  enterprises and that they could be deployed to perfectly legitimate 
ends such as securing inputs or marketing kolkhoz produce. Other research evidence (Mars 
and Altman, 1992) also highlighted that the second economy thrived in a symbiotic, if not 
parasitic, relationship to the formal sector and was, in some senses, an outgrowth of specific 
types of malfunction inherent in the command economy itself. The transition to the market 
and the crisis of the public sector have occasioned significant changes in the context and 
extent of informal activities and created new patterns of informalisation which complicate the 
calculation of household incomes considerably. 
 
Rural households in Uzbekistan currently make ends meet through a combination of  sources 
of livelihood. These are salaries and wages which may be paid in cash, in kind or through 
combinations of both, self-provisioning and sale or barter of produce from personal plots or 
animals, income from other trading or informal service activities and benefits and entitlements 
(such as pensions, child, maternity and invalidity benefits) which are paid in cash. The 
financial crisis of collective enterprises and the fact that they are chronically in arrears of 
wages has resulted in a tacit “informalisation” of registered, official activities. Let us consider 
the case of a woman worker at the local poultry factory in a village of Andijan province. Her 
salary currently consists of eggs which she must take to market or sell to intermediaries who 
collect produce from households. This is received in payment for a registered, official job 
which to take a monetary form has to go through the medium of petty trading, an activity 
normally associated with the informal economy. Similar conditions apply to workers at the 
local towel factory, with a resulting periodic glut of towels on local markets whenever they 
receive their “pay”. 
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The case of kolhoz workers is equally complicated. Workers organised in brigades normally 
have responsibility for a specific acreage of land planted with cotton (commonly 1 hectare, 
hence the term hektardji) year round for which they receive only in kind payment, except 
for the wages received for picking cotton.12 However, membership of the collective farm 
also gives them access to necessities which they would otherwise have to pay for such as the 
cotton stalks they use as fuel and animal fodder and the ability to graze animals on kolkhoz 
land. As a result, the calculation of money equivalents for in kind payments becomes a less 
than precise exercise.  
 
When payments in kind are not automatically translated into immediate contributions to the 
family budget, estimations of income become even more complicated. This point was 
graphically illustrated by the case of a villager who had grown melons and water melons on a 
plot of leased land and bartered them at the local commercial shop against one hundred 
cups and plates. These were meant not only for his own family but also for the trousseau of 
his daughter who was coming up to marriageable age. Acquiring crockery made the returns 
from his melons more inflation-proof than if he had received cash for them and will doubtless 
save him money in the longer run. This sequence of events also implies  that his immediate 
need for cash was not so pressing and that he was sufficiently comfortable to cover himself 
against some future expenditure. 
 
Finally, the calculation of unofficial wages presents even more intractable problems. By 
unofficial wage, I mean emoluments received privately by officially registered employees in 
the performance of their normal duties. Tractor and combine drivers on the kolkhoz do 
private work on the personal plots of villagers in exchange for a fixed cash payment per 
hectare, or a portion of the produce harvested in the case of combines. Although they pay 
for their own petrol, they use the machinery of the collective farm and do this work in lieu of 
wages. Workers in construction brigades may also work privately and offer their services 
for cash or wages in kind.13 Likewise, a hospital nurse may give injections privately when 
called upon by villagers in need of treatment. There is nothing novel in these types of 
activities which would normally go under the label of “moonlighting” or having a  job on the 
side. The novelty resides in the fact that these incomes have superseded official incomes 
which nonetheless may continue to be reported in household surveys. Moreover, 
researchers may find that there is little consistency in reporting practices. One tractor driver 
in an Andijan village declared his private earnings, while another stuck to his fictitious 
monthly wage. Others were genuinely unable to put a figure on their earnings due to the 
fluctuating nature of the demand for their services.  
 
There are other  unofficial incomes of a far less innocent nature than the private sale of one’s 
customary services. These are the bribes and extortions which those in commanding 
positions of administrative authority are able to exact from villagers. The example of  
bazarkoms, officials who allocate spaces in bazaars, was already cited as a position offering 
substantial scope for unofficial earnings. Ilkhamov  
( op.cit.) also remarks that the scale of exactions by officials (such as traffic police) on roads 
between village and town is of such magnitude that it has become one of the major obstacles 
to the development of private farming. These types of incomes are, needless to say, not 
susceptible to detection except through the obvious discrepancies one sometimes encounters 
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between declared incomes and ownership of consumer durables such as cars, videos and 
expensive furniture. 
 
In addition to these complications, I was able to identify what we might call 
phenomenological discrepancies in what respondents themselves consider as “income”. In 
one household, pensioners’ benefits and proceeds from the household plot were the only 
sources of livelihood. When asked what the major source of income of their household was, 
they insisted they had no source of income whatsoever. This occurred on several subsequent 
occasions. Since these families were plainly living off something, their insistence that they had 
no income at all needed interpretation. It became apparent that benefits were not perceived 
as income since this was something they were entitled to. As for the produce from their own 
plot, it all went towards self-subsistence. They earned no wage and therefore had no 
income. It was not simply a matter of whether they received cash or not, since pensions are 
paid in cash. It was more a question of defining what types of returns qualified as income so 
far as the respondents were concerned. I entertained the possibility that this might be a 
problem of translation since the Uzbek term daromad equally translates as profit. However, 
I was surprised to come across another household reporting pensions as the major source of 
income. Commenting on this discrepancy, I was informed that they were sufficiently poor to 
report their pensions.14 On the other hand, a sizeable proportion of registered workers 
receiving actual or theoretical wages did not report their wages as the major source of 
income of their households but mentioned their farming or animal husbandry activities 
instead. 
 
There are thus numerous sources of inaccuracy and possible bias in the reporting of 
household incomes. Some of these difficulties have to do with the nature of the incomes in 
question, others with a reluctance to reveal certain types of earnings and yet others relate to 
ways in which the meaning of “income” itself is interpreted by  respondents. The issue of 
interpretation became even more crucial in relation to questions concerning household 
expenditure. 
 
 
Household expenditure: here you see it, there you don’t 
 
Descriptions of the most important expenses incurred by households during the past twelve 
months took a variety of forms. In some cases, straightforward reporting of  items, such as 
the repair or construction costs for a house, was followed by a specific sum of money spent. 
The purchase of  consumer goods, such as a new battery for a car or a  carpet, was 
likewise reported in monetary values. In other cases, outgoings were described as an outlay 
of animals, produce, cash or various combinations of these. The most common incidence of 
such combinations could be found in enumerations of the costs of a wedding feast, 
circumcision or funeral ceremony. In many households, these life cycle events were the most 
frequently cited source of  major expenditure. A typical inventory of expenses might look as  
follows: two rams, one sack  (50 kgs.) of rice,  one sack of flour, twenty  litres of oil and ten 
kilograms of carrots. Deriving the money equivalents of these outlays was a relatively simple 
matter, frequently assisted by respondents’ own mental calculations. Whether these 
constituted net expenses was another matter, given that the value of gifts received on such 
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occasions may act to defray some of the costs. Nonetheless, these were cases where all 
outgoings, whether they took the form of cash, livestock or produce were acknowledged as 
expenses. 
 
I was alerted to the possibility that the concept of expenditure may itself be subject to 
differing interpretations by some findings from a village in the province of Kashkadarya. 
Here, one household identified the largest item of expenditure as the payment of 6,000 sums 
for medical expenses for the treatment of the respondent’s sick wife. In answer to a 
previous question, the same respondent had reported slaughtering two rams and one bull for 
various religious holidays and ceremonies (for iftorlik, the break of fast at Ramadan, for 
kurbanlik, the feast of sacrifice, and for a sunnat toy, the circumcision feast). Even the 
most superficial calculation suggested that the value of these animals far exceeded the sum 
reported as maximum expenditure, since a single ram would have fetched 6,000 sums. Yet 
these animals were not mentioned as expenditure. When I probed into this discrepancy, I 
was informed that these animals didn’t count as expenditure ‘because they were ours’. 
Whereas they had to spend cash for medical costs, and therefore reported it as a major 
expenditure, they were able to meet their ceremonial needs from their own flock. Clearly, 
this household was not thinking about the worth of its animals in terms of their market value 
or in money equivalents but as free goods, highlighting the extent to which the concept of 
expenditure itself  is relative to the degree of monetisation of the economy as a whole.  
 
Indeed, one of the characteristics of this particular village was the fact that few reported 
selling any of their produce on the market. This was a dry farming area with few marketable 
crops. Villagers grew wheat on their personal plots for their own consumption and some 
vegetables, if they could find water, but the principal form of wealth consisted in having 
animals, mainly sheep. Many necessities were obtained through barter and exchange. Only 
the poorest households reported that their women wove rugs (kelims)  for sale on the 
market and when animals were sold as a means of raising cash for essentials this was a tell-
tale sign of resource depletion. In addition, the actual cost of keeping animals was relatively 
minimal. The whole family, including children, participated in their care. Shepherding and 
taking animals to summer pastures could be achieved through informal arrangements with 
kolkhoz shepherds who added  private flocks to those of the collective farm in exchange for 
an animal or two depending on the size of the flock. Similar arrangements could be 
transacted with kin and neighbours.  
 
This situation contrasts sharply with that of villages in Andijan province where the degree of 
monetisation is much higher. In this area of irrigated farming many household smallholdings 
were producing crops for sale, particularly rice. The level of mechanisation of production on 
even relatively small plots was considerable and the cost of production much higher.15 
Transactions to obtain inputs (such access to  fertilisers and machinery)  were monetised, 
whether payments were made in cash or in kind, since the money equivalents of in kind 
payments were carefully calculated. One of the most striking findings here was that even 
what used to be a communal reciprocal helping arrangements, hashar, (such as neighbours 
coming together to help build a house)  now carries a hidden payment in the form of gifts 
considered to approximate the value of the services rendered. The reporting of household 
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expenditures in this region was more strictly monetised regardless of the type of outgoings ( 
whether they consisted of money, animals or other products). 
 
The contrasts between findings in different regions are hardly surprising if we remember that 
the calculation of costs may always be a relative matter. Even in the most industrialised 
countries of the North a householder keen on do-it-yourself who has just built himself a 
cabinet or a garden shed might report the cost of the materials purchased but treat his own 
labour as a “free” resource (although it may be argued that the labour of this amateur has a 
less obvious market value than that of a good cow). The reason why this gains particular 
relevance in rural Uzbekistan at this point in time is that the ways in which costs and 
expenditures are reported are both diagnostic of the degree of monetisation in any given 
locality and constitute an important baseline for monitoring the extent of penetration of a 
market economy. That is why rather than treating the concept of expenditure (or for that 
matter, income) as a self-evident, universal category ( which implicitly presupposes a market 
economy) it may be more pertinent at this stage to achieve a better qualitative understanding 
of  how these categories can be mapped out and utilised in different locations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Post-Soviet transitions have prompted a search for new policy tools and methods of data 
collection. The measurement of living standards and calculations of poverty lines have 
promoted the use of quantitative techniques and sample surveys as privileged tools for the 
collection of policy-relevant information. I have argued throughout this paper that survey 
data is valuable only to the extent that it builds upon a solid bedrock of in-depth, qualitative 
information about the processes under investigation. Using illustrations from a household 
survey carried out in four villages of the provinces of  Andijan and Kashkadarya in 
Uzbekistan, I offered an analysis of the ambiguities surrounding some basic concepts such as 
household, employment, access to land, income and expenditure. My findings suggest 
that not only are the processes and categories identified under these labels context-specific, 
but they are also likely to undergo further transformations as market reforms deepen.  
 
This raises a host of methodological issues which are not amenable to easy, prescriptive 
answers within the scope of a brief paper. Nonetheless, some general observations can be 
made about crucial areas of indeterminacy which should receive particular attention in the 
design of household surveys. The first concerns the use of official records, such as selsovet 
records, as sampling frames. These may or may not be adequate depending on the problem 
at hand. The illustrations provided in this paper suggest that households identified on the 
basis of village records do not necessarily correspond to self-contained budgeting and 
consumption units. A more exploratory approach should inform the choice of units of 
analysis.  
 
The second observation concerns the effects of  “transition”. These may be crystallising 
around a growing disjuncture between “official” occupations and wages and what people 
actually do to make a living. This disjuncture is reflected in the reporting of occupations and 
incomes in ways that make an accurate evaluation of both employment status and household 
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finances quite problematic. At this point in time, there is a tendency in rural Uzbekistan to 
carry on reporting wages that have now become fictitious and “registered” occupations (tied 
to the workbook system) that may no longer be related to a household’s main source of 
livelihood. This may not be simply put down to a reluctance to report informal earnings but 
may also reflect a genuine internalisation of Soviet definitions of what constitutes a “proper” 
job- one that not only brings wages but a range of entitlements and benefits. As this system 
gets progressively eroded, the tendency for reported occupations to fall into line with major 
income-generating activities will undoubtedly increase. The same applies to wages. The 
particular combinations of  cash and in kind payments received at present, the 
“informalisation” of  registered jobs described in this paper all correspond to a particular 
phase of the transition process. This period of crisis of the public sector is accompanied in 
Uzbekistan, by an effort to keep as many workers as possible “on th
government of Uzbekistan has made it an explicit policy goal to avoid the worst excesses of 
the market observed in other countries of the former Soviet Union (Human Development 
Report,1998)  and to “cushion” the social costs of transition. However, even the piecemeal 
agrarian reforms adopted are creating contradictions which are becoming apparent in the 
area of access to land. The simultaneous attempt to provide smallholders with a subsistence 
base while developing and diversifying leasehold markets in land is creating new tensions.  
 
Finally, the reporting of household incomes and expenditures may reflect different kinds of 
logic, depending on the degree of monetisation of local economies. Whereas in one region 
(Andijan) all outgoings, regardless of the form they take (cash, produce or animals) are 
accounted for as expenses, in another region (Kashkadarya) variations were observed in 
whether households calculated their animal wealth in terms of market values. It may well be 
that the expansion of a market economy may bring about a homogenising effect on the 
deployment of these categories. The use of sensitively designed, longitudinal surveys may not 
only serve to monitor these changes but may also make a substantial contribution to our 
currently limited understanding of transition from command to market economies in different 
regional and cultural contexts. 
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NOTES  
 
1This household survey was part of a broader project supported by a grant of the Department for 
International Development with participation from UNDP, Tashkent for a project titled ‘Rural Domestic 
Economy and Female Labour Supply in Uzbeksitan’. It was carried out in four villages with contrasting 
livelihood systems (irrigated farming, dry farming and animal husbandry and farming and rural industry) 
in the provinces of Andijan and Kashkadarya. Two interview schedules were used; a household 
interview and a women’s interview conducted with all co-resident adult women in the household. My 
thanks are due to Nadira Azimova who acted as national consultant on this project. 
 
2 This danger was brought home to me by the results of  the EUI/Essex Survey carried out in 1995 in 
three regions of Uzbekistan which attempted to estimate the incidence of private transfers among 
households, whether these take the form of gifts, exchanges or loans in cash or in kind ( Couduel , 
McAuley and Micklewright, 1997 ). This information was obtained by asking household heads or other 
persons answering the questionnaire whether they had received help from relatives or friends in the 30 
days prior to the interview. Although the survey established that a substantial number of households 
had been involved in either making or receiving cash or in kind transfers, it completely missed out on 
the most pervasive mechanism for private transfers, namely  gaps. Gaps are social get-togethers  
functioning as rotating savings associations where all the members of a network pay in a fixed sum of 
money each month which they receive as a lump sum when it is their turn to hold a gathering at their 
own home. Since these networks are primarily presented- and experienced- as venues for recreation and 
sociability there is no reason why they should have been reported in answer to the question posed. Yet 
gaps account for  the largest volume of cash in circulation based on private transfers and help to 
alleviate the shortage of ready money to make more important purchases. However,  the cultural 
embededness  of gaps meant that  their economic functions  could escape detection altogether ( 
Kandiyoti, 1998 ). 
 
3I choose to label these limllitations as ‘heuristic errors’ since an analysis of the reasons behind some 
apparent inconsistencies and omissions effectively reveals how respondents actually map out their 
worlds. 
 
4The literature on agricultural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, is rife with 
examples  of how assumptions about households as income-pooling, corporate units come up against 
the actual realities of  different customary practices. In cases where the automatic control of the male 
household head over the production and labour time of women cannot be taken for granted, and where 
projects make the assumption that such control exists, intensified intra-household conflict along gender 
lines  is frequently reported. 
 
5 Despite legal entitlement to private plots, the actual probability of being allocated one depends on the 
availability of  land. In Andijan province, where population pressure on land is extremely high, new 
allocations fell well below the legally allowed limit and many were actually denied  land. In Kashkadarya  
much larger allocations of  unirrigated land were made to households but  lack of water limited what they 
could cultivate and many used the land to grow fodder crops. 
 
6Admittedly, this only happened in two cases since divorce is relatively rare in villages. There is, 
however, a patrilineal bias in setting the boundaries of families. A disabled, single older brother 
receiving benefit is considered as part of the same family in a way that a divorced daughter can never 
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be. However, in the event of remarriage a divorced daughter’s children are frequently taken in by their 
maternal grandparents since it is considered unseemly for a woman to bring children from a previous 
marriage into her new  husbands’ household. 
 
7 Alisher Ilkhamov ( 1998 ) notes  the fact that this restructuring consisted mainly of converting state 
farms, which were centrally funded, into collective farms which hold their own budgets. As a result, 
there was a 30% increase in collective farms since 1991 and privatisation took the rather cosmetic form 
of  restructuring them as joint-stock companies now called shirkat. Since these enterprises are in 
permanent deficit, the pressure of having to pay salaries has resulted in either shedding some of their 
personnel or keeping them on the books without paying them wages. 
 
8There are, also, different categories of  non-employed. Housewives who are currently out of a job will 
report themselves as unemployed, whereas those who have never had a workbook will define 
themselves as housewives. Invalids receiving benefit, students receiving stipends, women on maternity 
leave, and pensioners constitute recognised categories of non-employed, distinctions that  are seldom 
found in rural societies where such provision is non-existent. 
 
9This became quite clear to me in discussions with Uzbek colleagues who expressed utter disbelief at the 
notion that pension rights could be tampered with or redefined. Verdery (1996) was  right in pointing out 
that the social compact between state and citizen under socialism was based on the paternalistic 
promise of  being provided for at the cost of restrictions of one’s personal freedoms in market and 
political terms. The elimination of the former in the absence of an expansion of the latter, as is currently 
the case in all Central Asian republics, could be the occasion of serious social disaffection and unrest. 
 
10 Some categories of skilled workers are better placed in this respect. For instance, a carpenter -builder 
registered in a construction brigade but receiving no wages can ply his trade privately and work during 
the construction season. Tractor and combine drivers are likewise able to do jobs on their own account. 
Unskilled agricultural workers are least able to command unofficial wages and  shirkats try to make sure 
they, at least, get paid in kind. Cotton harvesting wages are always paid in cash on a five-daily basis 
since the supply of an adequate  workforce during the peak season continues to be a problem. 
 
11 In the course of an interview with a farm manager I tried to highlight the problems  of leasing village 
land to outsiders by asking whether I would be permitted  to lease and cultivate a plot if  I came forward 
with the requisite capital. I was assured that I would be welcome to do so and that I would even find 
willing partners to join me in this farming venture. In reality, leaving aside any existing legislation 
barring foreigners from such enterprise, this would constitute quite a scandal and receive extremely 
negative evaluation whatever the formal rules might be. 
 
12This payment consists of basic necessities such as flour, cooking oil and rice. A calculation I made on 
the basis of money equivalents of these goods showed that it translates into a monthly income well 
below the official minimum wage ( Kandiyoti, 1998).  
 
13 Some payments in kind are more appreciated than cash. Bottles of vodka, for instance, are inflation-
proof, just like dollars. 
 
14 I am indebted to Nodira Azimova for heated and lengthy discussions on the meaning of some of these 
findings. She found it self-evident that better off families would not consider benefits as income 
whereas my own strictly monetary understanding dictated that all payments received must constitute 
income. 
15I was particularly struck by the fact that the number of women working as casual wage workers 
(mardigar) at the rice harvest was not particularly  high. If we compare this to  Southeast Asia where 
harvesting and processing rice constitutes an important source of income for poor rural women we may 
better appreciate the differences. However, the increase of manual operations in households who can no 
longer afford to pay for machines combined with rising unemployment on collective farms may well 
push up the demand and supply of casual workers. 
